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Security: Code Signing - downgrade prevention #118

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aiwaniuk opened this issue Aug 4, 2022 · 0 comments
Open

Security: Code Signing - downgrade prevention #118

aiwaniuk opened this issue Aug 4, 2022 · 0 comments

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@aiwaniuk
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aiwaniuk commented Aug 4, 2022

I think it may be worth to extend Code Signing section (https:/open-telemetry/opamp-spec/blob/main/specification.md#code-signing) and add downgrade protection recommendation.

Let's consider following scenario:

  1. Agent is running with version X of package A
  2. Vulnerability is found in package A (that for example allows code execution or bypass signature verification)
  3. Fix is released to package A in version X+1
  4. Agents are upgraded to use version X+1 in package A
  5. One year latter Server is compromised
  6. Attacker have old files version X of package A with signature and use this data to downgrade agents to vulnerable version
  7. Attacker have code execution on Agents

It will be nice to prevent from such scenario.

Possible solution:

  1. Signature should be generated for pair (SIGNATURE_COUNTER, downloadable executable)
  2. Agent should only accept downloadable executable with SIGNATURE_COUNTER >= CURRENT_SIGNATURE_COUNTER
  3. Agent after accepting downloadable executable sets CURRENT_SIGNATURE_COUNTER=SIGNATURE_COUNTER

Now such scenario is not possible, since attacker is not able to downgrade agents to version X

Server operator after any change (or security patches) to packages sets SIGNATURE_COUNTER=SIGNATURE_COUNTER+1 and recalculates signature for all packages.
Legitimate downgrades (with access to Certificate Authority private key) are still possible - just sign the old binary with new version.

I know that the actual code-signing and verification mechanism is Agent specific and this could be possibly implemented as part of it, but I think it may be worth to add this here since this problem scenario is rather related to problem of code signing for downloadable executables than generic code signing.

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