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chore(deps): update dependency depot/cli to v2.39.0 #926

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merged 1 commit into from
Oct 3, 2023

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This PR contains the following updates:

Package Update Change
depot/cli minor 2.38.1 -> 2.39.0

Release Notes

depot/cli (depot/cli)

v2.39.0: Depot CLI 2.39.0

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What's Changed


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This PR has been generated by Renovate Bot.

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Auto-approved because label type/renovate is present.

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github-actions bot commented Oct 3, 2023

🔍 Vulnerabilities of ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/depot:2.39.0

📦 Image Reference ghcr.io/uniget-org/tools/depot:2.39.0
digestsha256:c074793c904bd8cd53894ef30ee65e168e92731d5627a1049f3f191cef3faf86
vulnerabilitiescritical: 0 high: 2 medium: 7 low: 0
platformlinux/amd64
size12 MB
packages168
critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 2 low: 0 github.com/docker/docker 23.0.0+incompatible (golang)

pkg:golang/github.com/docker/[email protected]+incompatible

high 7.5: CVE--2023--28840 Unprotected Alternate Channel

Affected range>=23.0.0
<23.0.3
Fixed version23.0.3
CVSS Score7.5
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:L
Description

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.

Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.

The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.

Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.

When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.

Two iptables rules serve to filter incoming VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted network and discards unencrypted datagrams. The rules are appended to the end of the INPUT filter chain, following any rules that have been previously set by the system administrator. Administrator-set rules take precedence over the rules Moby sets to discard unencrypted VXLAN datagrams, which can potentially admit unencrypted datagrams that should have been discarded.

On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the xt_u32 module has been:

These rules are not created when xt_u32 is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.

Impact

Encrypted overlay networks on affected configurations silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams.

The injection of arbitrary Ethernet frames can enable a Denial of Service attack. A sophisticated attacker may be able to establish a UDP or TCP connection by way of the container’s outbound gateway that would otherwise be blocked by a stateful firewall, or carry out other escalations beyond simple injection by smuggling packets into the overlay network.

Patches

Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.

Workarounds

  • Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to incoming traffic at the Internet boundary (see GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw) to prevent all VXLAN packet injection.
  • Ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Background

  • #43382 partially discussed this concern, but did not consider the security implications.
  • Mirantis FIELD-5788 essentially duplicates #43382, and was created six months earlier; it similarly overlooked the security implications.
  • #45118 is the ancestor of the final patches, and was where the security implications were discovered.

Related

medium 6.8: CVE--2023--28842 Unprotected Alternate Channel

Affected range>=23.0.0
<23.0.3
Fixed version23.0.3
CVSS Score6.8
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
Description

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.

Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.

The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.

Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.

When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.

The overlay driver dynamically and lazily defines the kernel configuration for the VXLAN network on each node as containers are attached and detached. Routes and encryption parameters are only defined for destination nodes that participate in the network. The iptables rules that prevent encrypted overlay networks from accepting unencrypted packets are not created until a peer is available with which to communicate.

Impact

Encrypted overlay networks silently accept cleartext VXLAN datagrams that are tagged with the VNI of an encrypted overlay network. As a result, it is possible to inject arbitrary Ethernet frames into the encrypted overlay network by encapsulating them in VXLAN datagrams. The implications of this can be quite dire, and GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw should be referenced for a deeper exploration.

Patches

Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.

Workarounds

  • In multi-node clusters, deploy a global ‘pause’ container for each encrypted overlay network, on every node. For example, use the registry.k8s.io/pause image and a --mode global service.
  • For a single-node cluster, do not use overlay networks of any sort. Bridge networks provide the same connectivity on a single node and have no multi-node features.
    The Swarm ingress feature is implemented using an overlay network, but can be disabled by publishing ports in host mode instead of ingress mode (allowing the use of an external load balancer), and removing the ingress network.
  • If encrypted overlay networks are in exclusive use, block UDP port 4789 from traffic that has not been validated by IPSec. For example, iptables -A INPUT -m udp —-dport 4789 -m policy --dir in --pol none -j DROP.

Background

Related

medium 6.8: CVE--2023--28841 Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data

Affected range>=23.0.0
<23.0.3
Fixed version23.0.3
CVSS Score6.8
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Description

Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (dockerd), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as Docker.

Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in dockerd and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code.

The overlay network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cluster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes.

Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption.

When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the u32 iptables extension provided by the xt_u32 kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN.

An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation.

On Red Hat Enterprise Linux and derivatives such as CentOS and Rocky, the xt_u32 module has been:

This rule is not created when xt_u32 is unavailable, even though the container is still attached to the network.

Impact

Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, overlay networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees.

It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may rely on Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability is no longer guaranteed.

Patches

Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16.

Workarounds

  • Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary (see GHSA-vwm3-crmr-xfxw) in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet.
  • Ensure that the xt_u32 kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.

Background

  • #43382 partially discussed this concern, but did not consider the security implications.
  • Mirantis FIELD-5788 essentially duplicates #43382, and was created six months earlier; it similarly overlooked the security implications.
  • #45118 is the ancestor of the final patches, and was where the security implications were discovered.

Related

critical: 0 high: 1 medium: 0 low: 0 github.com/docker/distribution 2.8.1+incompatible (golang)

pkg:golang/github.com/docker/[email protected]+incompatible

high 7.5: CVE--2023--2253 Undefined Behavior for Input to API

Affected range<2.8.2-beta.1
Fixed version2.8.2-beta.1
CVSS Score7.5
CVSS VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Description

Impact

Systems that run distribution built after a specific commit running on memory-restricted environments can suffer from denial of service by a crafted malicious /v2/_catalog API endpoint request.

Patches

Upgrade to at least 2.8.2-beta.1 if you are running v2.8.x release. If you use the code from the main branch, update at least to the commit after f55a6552b006a381d9167e328808565dd2bf77dc.

Workarounds

There is no way to work around this issue without patching. Restrict access to the affected API endpoint: see the recommendations section.

References

/v2/_catalog endpoint accepts a parameter to control the maximum amount of records returned (query string: n).

When not given the default n=100 is used. The server trusts that n has an acceptable value, however when using a
maliciously large value, it allocates an array/slice of n of strings before filling the slice with data.

This behaviour was introduced ~7yrs ago [1].

Recommendation

The /v2/_catalog endpoint was designed specifically to do registry syncs with search or other API systems. Such an endpoint would create a lot of load on the backend system, due to overfetch required to serve a request in certain implementations.

Because of this, we strongly recommend keeping this API endpoint behind heightened privilege and avoiding leaving it exposed to the internet.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

[1] faulty commit

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 4 low: 0 stdlib 1.20.5 (golang)

pkg:golang/[email protected]

medium : CVE--2023--29406

Affected range>=1.20.0-0
<1.20.6
Fixed version1.20.6
Description

The HTTP/1 client does not fully validate the contents of the Host header. A maliciously crafted Host header can inject additional headers or entire requests.

With fix, the HTTP/1 client now refuses to send requests containing an invalid Request.Host or Request.URL.Host value.

medium : CVE--2023--39319

Affected range<1.20.8
Fixed version1.20.8
Description

The html/template package does not apply the proper rules for handling occurrences of "<script", "<!--", and "</script" within JS literals in <script> contexts. This may cause the template parser to improperly consider script contexts to be terminated early, causing actions to be improperly escaped. This could be leveraged to perform an XSS attack.

medium : CVE--2023--39318

Affected range<1.20.8
Fixed version1.20.8
Description

The html/template package does not properly handle HTML-like "" comment tokens, nor hashbang "#!" comment tokens, in <script> contexts. This may cause the template parser to improperly interpret the contents of <script> contexts, causing actions to be improperly escaped. This may be leveraged to perform an XSS attack.

medium : CVE--2023--29409

Affected range>=1.20.0-0
<1.20.7
Fixed version1.20.7
Description

Extremely large RSA keys in certificate chains can cause a client/server to expend significant CPU time verifying signatures.

With fix, the size of RSA keys transmitted during handshakes is restricted to <= 8192 bits.

Based on a survey of publicly trusted RSA keys, there are currently only three certificates in circulation with keys larger than this, and all three appear to be test certificates that are not actively deployed. It is possible there are larger keys in use in private PKIs, but we target the web PKI, so causing breakage here in the interests of increasing the default safety of users of crypto/tls seems reasonable.

critical: 0 high: 0 medium: 1 low: 0 golang.org/x/net 0.8.0 (golang)

pkg:golang/golang.org/x/[email protected]

medium : CVE--2023--3978

Affected range<0.13.0
Fixed version0.13.0
Description

Text nodes not in the HTML namespace are incorrectly literally rendered, causing text which should be escaped to not be. This could lead to an XSS attack.

@github-actions
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github-actions bot commented Oct 3, 2023

Attempting automerge. See https:/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/6387496872.

@github-actions
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github-actions bot commented Oct 3, 2023

PR is clean and can be merged. See https:/uniget-org/tools/actions/runs/6387496872.

@github-actions github-actions bot merged commit 18089a9 into main Oct 3, 2023
8 of 9 checks passed
@github-actions github-actions bot deleted the renovate/depot-cli-2.x branch October 3, 2023 01:27
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